Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 1.4

Lord Carrington's Mediation of the Rhodesian Settlement:

Zimbabwe's Second Chimurenga Concludes

Resat Bayer

1. Chronology of the Dispute
· April 1964: Ian Smith took over the Rhodesian Front and began actively campaigning for Rhodesian Independence. British prime minister Harold Wilson outlined a list of conditions, including racial equality.(1)

· May 1965: Smith's party won all 50 seats in the elections.(2)

· November 11, 1965: Ian Smith's government unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent from Britain. No nation recognized it.(3)

· 1966: UNSC imposed mandatory trade sanctions but cooperation with white-ruled South Africa and the Portuguese who ruled Mozambique and Angola meant that Rhodesia was able to obtain essential commodities, e.g., petroleum.(4)

· April 28, 1966: Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe, Ndabaningi Sithole, Moton Malianga and Leopold Takawiara's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) decided that armed intransigence was necessary against the white regime. On this day, the Second Chimurenga (as the war for black majority rule in Rhodesia was known) began when ZANU guerrillas attacked Rhodesian forces.(5)

· 1966, 1967: British officials and Ian Smith failed to agree on the question of independence in talks on British battleships.(6)

· 1968: UN banned its members from trading with Rhodesia.(7)

· 1969: The census showed that most whites were born outside of Rhodesia. The system of land rights (dating from 1930) was further codified with the Land Tenure Act. It 'equally' divided the land between blacks and whites but it meant that an average white farmer received 6,100 acres while the average African farmer received 7 acres.(8)

· 1971: British foreign secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home persuaded the Rhodesians to increase African representation in Parliament (Smith-Home pact) and majority rule was to start in the next century. Britain also announced that its recognition was based on the Pearce Commission's findings on Black African opinion. The Commission's findings showed that the Africans were hostile to the regime.(9)

· Late 1972: The guerrilla war started affecting white Rhodesia. Josiah Tongogara attacked isolated white farmers in northeastern Rhodesia. Tongogara, commander of ZANLA, ZANU's military forces, had received Maoist tactical training in China (ZANLA adopted the Maoist principle 'Guerrillas swimming like fish in the water of the people'). (10) ZANLA also was using Mozambique as a sanctuary to conduct its attacks.

· April 25, 1974: The Lisbon Coup and subsequent fall of the fascist regime in Portugal was to have a dramatic effect on African politics.(11)

· December 8, 1974: At Lusaka, Zambia, the various nationalist groups were united under Bishop Abel Muzorewa's African National Congress.(12)

· Dec. 1974-Aug.1975: At Victoria Falls, Prime Minister of South Africa John Vorster and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda persuaded Smith to call a cease-fire and release high ranking members of the nationalist movement (Nkomo, Sithole, and Mugabe) to allow peace negotiations to begin. This was the first mediation effort. The results were dismal. In the aftermath, ZANU split and Mugabe replaced Sithole as the leader of ZANU and Nkomo was expelled from ANC.(13)

· 1975: Marxist-oriented FRELIMO assumed power in Mozambique and its independence made it easier for the guerrillas to attack Rhodesia.(14)

· October 9, 1976: ZANU and ZAPU formed an alliance known as the Patriotic Front. The military forces of the two also combined to form ZIPA.(15)

· Oct. 28-Dec. 14 1976: All-Party Geneva Conference on Rhodesia held. This was a mediation effort involving US secretary of state Henry Kissinger and John Vorster. Kissinger practiced "'lying to both sides'" and failed.(16) A commitment from Smith to majority rule was obtained.

· 1977: 197 Rhodesians were killed in action and close to 11,000 emigrated.(17)

· April 1977-Dec. 1978: The Anglo-American mediation effort carried out by Britain's foreign secretary David Owen and US secretary of state Cyrus Vance failed.(18)

· March 3, 1978: Internal Settlement between Smith and the non-Patriotic Front African parties reached.(19) Black majority rule (one person, one vote) was granted but interests of the whites were protected.

· July 1978: At Khartoum, OAU Council of Ministers denounced the internal settlement and praised the Patriotic Front.(20)

· September 3, 1978: An Air Rhodesia Viscount civilian aircraft was shot down by ZAPU's military wing, ZIPRA. Similar attacks followed.(21)

· December 20, 1978: The war was into its thirteenth year. In 1978, 13,000 whites had emigrated and 2,450 guerrillas, 282 Rhodesian troops, 3,406 black civilians, and 173 white noncombatants lost their lives.(22) The civil war cost Rhodesia one million dollars each day and whites emigrated at a rate of 1,000 per month.(23)

· April 1979: Parliament elections were held (64.45 turnout). ZANU and ZAPU boycotted the elections. The African National Council of Muzorewa won.(24)

· May 1, 1979: Smith handed the office of prime minister to Muzorewa but the whites retained the key points in the civil service, government and in the army. International diplomatic recognition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as it was now called, did not take place.(25)

· May 3, 1979: Conservatives won the elections in Great Britain. Margaret Thatcher wanted to be rid of this problem. The Conservative Manifestation had said that if Rhodesia met certain principles then it would be recognized by Britain.(26)

· July 1, 1979: At Canberra, the Australian Prime Minister, Malcom Fraser, startled Thatcher by announcing that Australia was against any leniency towards Smith and Muzorewa and that they were in agreement with the Front-line states.(27)

· August 1, 1979: Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka opened. A compromise plan was agreed. Britain received a mandate to mediate.(28)

· August 14, 1979: Britain extended invitations to Muzorewa government and the Patriotic Front.(29)

· September 7-9, 1979: At Nonaligned Movement summit meeting in Cuba, Patriotic Front members were coerced into going to London.(30) Patriotic Front said that they would only negotiate with the British.

· September 10, 1979: The delegations met at Lancaster House in London to draw up a constitution satisfactory to the Patriotic Front (led by Nkomo and Mugabe) as well as the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government (led by Muzorewa and Smith). Carrington's agenda constituted first agreeing on a constitution, followed by transitional arrangements and new elections, and finally the cease-fire plan.(31)

· December 21, 1979: Agreement was signed at Lancaster House.(32)

· January 1, 1980: Seven guerrillas were killed in a clash with Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces 60 miles north of Salisbury.(33)

· January 4, 1980: By the deadline, 18,500 Patriot Front guerrillas had reported to assembly points around Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.(34)

· January 9, 1980: First direct links with outside world was reestablished with the arrival of a passenger airline flight from Lusaka, Zambia.(35)

· January 13, 1980: Joshua Nkomo returned to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after three years of exile. 100,000 greeted him.(36)

· January 14, 1980: Ten black parties registered for the elections. Nkomo registered ZAPU under the name of Patriotic Front.(37)

· January 18, 1980: The state of emergency was extended until July.(38)

· January 21, 1980: First group of refugees (1,000) returned from Botswana.(39)

· January 22, 1980: Lord Soames, British governor, accused Mugabe's ZANU and outgoing Prime Minister Muzorewa's irregular troops of truce violations.(40)

· January 26, 1980: The withdrawal of 26 South African contingents guarding links from South Africa to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was announced.(41)

· January 27, 1980: Mugabe returned after more than four years in exile, more than 200,000 greeted him.(42)

· February 2, 1980: UNSC adopted a resolution calling upon Great Britain to insure fair elections for a black majority government took place.(43)

· February 10, 1980: Mugabe escaped assassination as a bomb blew off behind his car amid growing political violence.(44)

· February 14, 1980: Whites voted. Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front won all 20 seats reserved for the whites.(45)

· February 25, 1980: The process of readmitting refugees were halted until after the election.(46) A symbolic step toward creating an integrated force took place when a contingent of ZAPU's guerrillas started maneuvers with the regular army.(47)

· February 27-29, 1980: Voting in the election took place (voter turnout was 93.6%).(48)

· March 2, 1980: A Commonwealth observation team concluded that the election had been free and fair.(49)

· March 3, 1980: Lord Soames and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian officials went on television to urge the population to remain clam after it was clear that Mugabe would win. Soames had by this time sorted out his differences with Mugabe. The withdrawal of Commonwealth peacekeeping forces began.(50)

· March 4, 1980: Robert Mugabe's ZANU won the elections for a new black government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. ZANU obtained 62.9% of the popular vote which meant 57 of the 80 seats reserved for blacks in the 100-member parliament; Nkomo received 24.1% (20 seats); and Muzorewa got 8.2% (3 seats). In Mugabe's public announcements, moderation was evident.(51)

· March 5, 1980: ZANU guerrillas started training with the regular army.(52)

· March 11, 1980: Prime Minister-elect Mugabe presented a list of his Cabinet appointments to Lord Soames. Two whites were given portfolios. Mugabe kept for himself the post of defense minister; Nkomo was given the post of home affairs (i.e., control of the police). There was one woman in the Cabinet.(53)

· March 13, 1980: Mugabe promised changes to enable more blacks to enter the civil service. Nkomo would also oversee immigration. The government announced that it would respect all old debts, as long as they were not for arms purchases.(54)

· April 15, 1980: Lt. Gen. Walls was appointed to head the new Zimbabwean army.(55)

· April 15, 1980: Britain proclaimed that it would give Zimbabwe $165 million between 1981-83 partly to train black civil servants and the Zimbabwean army.(56)

· April 17, 1980: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia officially became the independent nation of Zimbabwe. The US was the first country to open an embassy.(57)

· April 19, 1980: The 21 ministers were sworn in.(58)

· April 20, 1980: The government's first official action was issuing the budget which gave priority to helping poor blacks.(59)

· May 30, 1980: Prime Minister Mugabe asked for more British military training personnel to help integrate the armies into the new national army. Mozambique and Zimbabwe "exchanged pledges of assistance in security matters".(60)

· June 27, 1980: Zimbabwe closed South Africa's diplomatic mission in Salisbury.(61)

· July 17, 1980: Lt. Gen. Peter Walls, the white chief of Zimbabwe's joint Military High Command, announced that he intended to leave his post as of July 29 because "'it's the overcoming of the problems which has made me feel that it is okay for me to retire now.'"(62)

· July 23, 1980: The Parliament renewed for six months the state of emergency first introduced by the white Rhodesian government in 1964.(63)

· August 25, 1980: Zimbabwe became the 153rd member of the UN.(64)

· August 27, 1980: In New York City, Prime Minister Mugabe praised President Carter for his role in settling the civil war.(65)

· August 31, 1980: Ian Smith urged the whites to remain and made favorable comments about the majority-rule government.(66)

· September 30, 1980: Emigration had risen in August to its highest level since 1978.(67)

· Nov. 10-11, 1980: Near Bulawayo, the country's second largest city, where more than 3,000 former guerrilla soldiers from both factions had been resettled, at least 43 persons were killed and 300 injured in the most violent fighting between the rival guerrilla factions since independence.(68)

2.a. Parties to the Dispute

The white community, while tiny (around five percent) was in control of the agricultural and industrial activities as well as the state institutions. The black community was disproportionately underrepresented and weak in almost all aspects of life. By mid-1979, the primary parties to the dispute were the Patriotic Front members and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government. The Patriotic Front was made of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa but lacked legitimacy among blacks. This 'puppet' government was the brainchild of Ian Smith, head of the Rhodesian Front (the main white party), who had given up the position (of Prime Minister) but was still an important actor. Smith was on record as having said that the happiest Africans lived in his country, "'our black Rhodesians are among the best blacks that you can find anywhere in the world'"(69) and that black rule would never take place in his life time or in that of his children. This government's raison d'être was safeguarding white interests under the guise of majority 'rule'. Muzorewa headed African National Council (ANC) but lacked a clear political constituency; he was critical of liberation movements that advocated the use of violence to topple the regime.(70) Muzorewa's government wanted recognition and the ending of economic sanctions.

The Patriotic Front believed that the war had been about "the total liquidation of colonialism in Zimbabwe"(71). It never really united because of animosity between the two factions. Their ideologies were different: Mugabe presented himself as "a committed Marxist while Nkomo was still in the middle of the road" and resented the fact that Nkomo's ZAPU was receiving more international acclaim.(72) Also, their priorities were different: ZANU wanted military unity first while ZAPU wanted political unity first.(73)

ZAPU was led by Joshua Nkomo, an elder statesman and one of the fathers of nationalism. Compared to Mugabe, Nkomo was seen by the whites as the lesser evil. ZAPU's ethnic base was limited (i.e., minority Ndebele people) which made Nkomo more amicable to a non-military solution. ZAPU was based mostly in Zambia. ZIPRA was its military wing but was less operational when compared to ZANU's military wing, ZANLA. It was believed that that ZIPRA was waiting for ZANLA to do all the work before it handed the coup de grace and seized control. ZIPRA carried out many attacks on civilian planes and devastated white morale.

ZANU was led by Robert Mugabe. Dissidents from ZAPU had originally set it up. This faction had a broad ethnic base (i.e., majority Shona people). They were more integrated with the people than ZAPU. Mozambique was its patron. Militarily, they played the greater role. ZANLA was commanded by the able Josiah Tongogara. Adoption of Maoist tactics made it hard for the Rhodesian security forces to eradicate them. They controlled much of the Shona countryside. Mugabe was a Roman Catholic and Marxist schoolteacher. Mugabe believed that the only solution was a military solution.

Secondary parties were the Front-line states, South Africa, Great Britain and to a lesser degree the United States of America, Nigeria, Commonwealth and Organization of African Unity.

The main Front-line states were Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique. Zambia, led by President Kenneth Kaunda, was the patron of ZAPU. This civil war had hurt Zambia the most amongst the region's countries. ZAPU's forces stationed in Zambia outnumbered Zambian security forces. Mozambique's liberation was a key point in the conflict. It offered a sanctuary to the guerrillas. Samora Machel's Mozambique was the patron of ZANU. Mozambique was less affected economically than Zambia but more affected than Julius Nyerere's Tanzania, which led it to be the most radical.

South Africa was the patron of Rhodesia. It had great leverage over its neighbor: South Africa was helping its client both economically and militarily. While there were similarities in the regimes, South African was more interested in having a stable regime than in having a white regime. Also, the South Africans resented the fact that whites in Rhodesia had rejected uniting with them in the 1920s and that while South Africans were Afrikaners (with all its implications), the Rhodesians could not make such a claim.

Great Britain was the former colonial power. Also, many people in Great Britain sympathized with the whites in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It was one of the issues in the political arena. Britain saw this as a problem that was hurting its relations with other countries.

The United States looked at this problem through superpower lenses (especially under Henry Kissinger) and then, under President Carter, human rights was somewhat brought to the surface. However, this conflict never took the forefront. Rather, it was a sideshow while the main spectacle was attempts to improve relations with Africa in general and thus gain allies against the Soviets. Nigeria was one of the key African countries at the time. The oil crisis gave them leverage to keep the conflict at Zimbabwe in the minds of the west. Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth were two important non-state actors.

2. b. Issues

There were many issues to be discussed. Democracy and land were the key issues. Other important issues included minority rights and majority rule. Majority rule (one person, one vote) was by this time conceded by the whites. However, major changes were necessary in the constitution. The land issue was of crucial importance to the guerrillas. Poverty was tied to the land. Ideologies embraced by the various parties were, it seemed, in conflict as well. Identity problems and power-sharing were other topics that have to be mentioned.

There was also problem of how much international involvement should be allowed in the solution and the implementation of the solution. The amount of armies and people connected to the factions was another problem. In case of cessation of hostilities, what type of a transition government was to be put into place? Implementation of any agreement was going to be hard because of the distrust.

The British decided to discuss the main constitutional issues and majority rule first followed by the transition period and dealing with the cease-fire last. They believed that a step-by-step approach would be the best to control the negotiations.

Chronology of the Mediation effort

· September 10, 1979: Lord Carrington delivered his opening address and presented his outline of the constitution as the basis for negotiations and maintained that constitutional issue must be solved first. Patriotic Front put forward its own agenda.(74)

· September 12, 1979: Smith caused the first split in the Rhodesian side by supporting the Patriotic Front agenda (he wanted to see the entire deal).(75)

· September 14, 1979: Patriotic Front presented its constitutional proposals; Carrington said that only British proposals could be negotiated.(76)

· September 18, 1979: Carrington decided to hold bilateral meetings (and the practice of first negotiating with Rhodesian commenced).(77)

· September 19-21, 1979: Ian Smith argued that white safeguards must not be diluted. Carrington presented the Salisbury delegation with numbers (twenty out of 100 seats would be reserved for the whites and seventy votes would be necessary to amend the constitution). The Salisbury delegation accepted the offer.(78)

· October 2, 1979: The negotiations between the British and the Patriotic Front became heated. Mugabe and Nkomo gave their first joint press conference and accused the British of complicity with Rhodesia.(79)

· October 3-9, 1979: Carrington delivered his first deadline: He wanted an answer by the eight. Muzorewa accepted but the Patriotic Front refused and offered to move on to the next item. Carrington rejected the offer and extended the deadline.(80)

· October 11, 1979: Carrington decided to seek support from the presidents of the Front-line states and the Commonwealth.(81)

· October 15, 1979: So as to break the deadlock, Carrington used, for the first time, a 'second-class solution' tool. This tool would have meant recognizing Rhodesia. To make the threat more credible, he suspended the Patriotic Front from the negotiations. This resulted in the secretary-general of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal, scolding Carrington. Britain became more accommodating.(82)

· October 16, 1979: Patriotic Front started to back down and said that they would join the negotiations as soon as the issue of compensation for land was solved.(83)

· October 15-18, 1979: The United States offered economic support to Zimbabwe which was of crucial importance (i.e., compensation for land).(84)

· October 18, 1979: Patriotic Front announced that "there will not be need to revert to the discussion on the constitution" provided that they were satisfied with the transitional arrangements.(85)

· October 22, 1979: Carrington presented the British proposals on the transition period: It was to last for two months and a British governor was to direct the country, through the existing bureaucracy and the security forces, as well as supervise the elections.(86) The plan was equally ghastly to all sides.

· October 26, 1979: Patriotic Front denounced Carrington's "dictatorial attitude;" they were particularly angry at the fact that the British were going to be using the Rhodesian bureaucracy and security forces which they believed would not be impartial. They wanted UN and Patriotic Front forces to be used.(87)

· October 28, 1979: Prime Minister Muzorewa agreed to step down after a night of prayer.(88)

· November 1, 1979: Patriotic Front threatened to leave the negotiations but, without support from the Front-line states, they did not seem credible.(89)

· November 2, 1979: Britain wanted an answer by the fifth. The date was important because that week the British Parliament would debate the continuation of sanctions imposed on Rhodesia.(90)

· November 5, 1979: Muzorewa said that they had accepted the British proposals.(91) Patriotic Front was not forthcoming.

· November 7, 1979: Britain introduced into its Parliament a bill that would have started the motion of bringing Rhodesia back under British authority; the Patriotic Front was furious. Carrington placed a deadline for the next day.(92)

· November 8, 1979: Carrington rebuked the Patriotic Front for not providing an answer. The Patriotic Front said it was a misunderstanding and that they had met President Kaunda of Zambia who had flown to London to help break the deadlock.(93) Ian Smith accepted 'defeat' and said "'the time has come to tell our people back home that to continue the fight would now be sterile, even counter-productive.'"(94)

· November 10, 1979: Britain agreed to set up a Commonwealth force and gave more time and increased the transition time by a couple of weeks.(95)

· November 13, 1979: Carrington offered the Patriotic Front a face-saver by recognizing the equality of the forces in the conflict.(96)

· November 14, 1979: Carrington and Mugabe discussed areas of agreement and disagreement.(97)

· November 15, 1979: Patriotic Front accepted the transition plan.(98)

· November 16, 1979: Britain presented its cease-fire plan which called for the cessation of movement of troops (bases for the Rhodesian troops; assembly points for the guerrillas), and coming under the command of the British governor.(99)

· November 16-19, 1979: Zambia's few remaining links to the outside world were bombed by Rhodesian troops but President Kaunda did not retaliate.(100)

· November 19, 1979: The Patriotic Front counter-proposals demanded a substantial Commonwealth presence and the disbandment of certain Rhodesian units.(101)

· November 22, 1979: Britain presented ultimatums (demanding a reply by November 26th) which resulted in Mugabe remarking that Lord Carrington "could 'go to hell.'"(102)

· November 25, 1979: Following a meeting with the Front-line Presidents at Dar es Salaam, Nkomo and Mugabe declared that they had their backing but in private, the Presidents urged greater accommodation.(103)

· November 26, 1979: Muzorewa's delegation embraced the British proposals but the Patriotic Front took their time.(104)

· December 6, 1979: Patriotic Front gave partial acceptance but demanded more time and more assembly points.(105)

· December 7, 1979: Lord Soames was appointed as governor and the Zimbabwe bill on the granting of a status of republic was published angering the Patriotic Front in the process.(106)

· December 11, 1979: The Rhodesian Parliament dissolved itself.(107)

· December 13, 1979: Sanctions on Rhodesia were lifted (and further angered the Patriotic Front who believed that the British were acting rashly).(108)

· December 14, 1979: Carrington demanded firm reply which caused the Patriotic Front to express their hostility: "Thatcher can jump in the Thames;" "The answer, Lord Carrington, is No . . . No . . . No . . .;" and "Carrington can go to hell".(109) President Machel stepped in and supposedly had a message delivered to Mugabe to accept or "he would be welcomed back to Mozambique and given a beach villa where he could write his memoirs."(110)

· December 17, 1979: The Patriotic Front signed the cease-fire agreement.(111)

· December 21, 1979: The final agreement was signed by all parties on the 102nd day of the conference.(112)

4. Initial and Changing positions in the Negotiation

The sides involved in the conflict were at diametrically opposed positions which led the British to decide that the only way forward was to dictate the agreement (that would be disliked by both sides).

Patriotic Front, especially ZANU and its leader, had initially believed that the only solution was a military one. Therefore, the fact that they were negotiating was a clear example of how much their positions had evolved. Right before the negotiations at Lancaster House started, Mugabe said "We have not come here to negotiate with Smith or Muzorewa. We have not come here to negotiate the principles of majority rule. We have come here to negotiate with the British the transfer of power. Nothing else is for discussion."(113)

Before coming to the negotiations, Mugabe had presented three principles which were of vital importance to ZANU: independence and sovereignty for the people of Zimbabwe; disintegration of Smith's regime; and the disablement of the armed forces of the "illegal regime" and their replacement with those of the liberation forces.(114) ZANU found many of these principles being challenged by the British proposals. For example, the armed forces of the 'illegal regime' were to be combined with those of the liberation forces and while some of the privileges for the whites were eradicated, they were still given twenty seats in the Parliament. Yet worse, the British seemed to give more importance to the security forces of Rhodesia

At the Conference, the Rhodesians said they would only discuss constitutional issues. Yet, they conceded to discuss other issues as well. After having agreed to hold elections again, everything came down. Muzorewa's 'resignation' meant that the curtain was falling; they became complacent. Their attitude can be explained by the fact that they were hoping that the Patriotic Front would walk away from the negotiations which would result in Britain recognizing the internal settlement (the 'second-class solution'). Whoever left the table first was going to lose more. The attitude of the Rhodesians was best summarized by Ken Flower, the head of the Rhodesian Intelligence service, "We needed a settlement, any kind of settlement."(115)

The Front-line presidents had made it clear to the leaders of the Patriotic Front that they wanted peace. They seem to have scared Nkomo. Although Mugabe was not easily dissuaded, the commander of ZANU's military forces (ZANLA), Tongogara was more forthcoming. Tongogara's attitude can be explained through his belief that Mozambique was serious in its threat (of ending support) and "if there are elections, free and fair, we are sure to win them; no one else has comparable machinery to what we have."(116)

On the matter of the constitution, the Muzorewa government accepted the British proposals. The British proposals included the creation of a two-house legislature with 20 out of 100 lower-house seats reserved for whites. Muzorewa and most of his delegation had no problem accepting it. However, Ian Smith insisted that a blocking mechanism in the legislature was necessary. Finally, the delegation voted amongst themselves and the result was 11-1 (even the other whites and members of his Rhodesian Front had turned against him). Thus the Rhodesian delegation accepted the British constitutional proposals.

The Patriotic Front did not like many of the constitutional proposals. However, it was really over the issue of land that they remained inflexible. Land had been obtained by the whites at extremely low prices and Carrington was insisting on white property rights being guaranteed. Land was the key issue of this civil war and they could not afford to look weak. Following assurances that there would be aid for land resettlement, agriculture, and economic development from the west, Patriotic Front accepted the British proposals. There were criticisms on other items but their 'patrons' brought them into line.

Tensions in the debate over the transition process increased because both sides feared the other side breaking the truce. The British proposal was to have a British-appointed governor with broad powers rule the country for two months and create the conditions for free and fair elections. Prime Minister Muzorewa resented the fact that he had to give up his position and he knew that this would be taken as a show of weakness but he gave in. The Patriotic Front did not believe that the British Governor would be impartial, especially as he would be relying on Rhodesian forces and bureaucracy. After some alterations, pressure, face-savers and symbolic moves, e.g., "agreeing to make the military commanders on both sides equally responsible for maintaining the cease-fire . . . implied equal status for the rival armies,"(117) the Patriotic Front accepted the proposals.

The last and most difficult stage dealt with the cease-fire. Lack of trust was the problem here. Britain presented its cease-fire plan in which: it called for the cessation of movement of troops (Rhodesian troops would report to their main bases while guerrillas would go to assembly points); it made the military commanders responsible to the British governor; it created a cease-fire monitoring group; and it set up a cease-fire commission. The Muzorewa delegation had some reservations but it accepted the British proposals (as usual hoping that the other side would not). The Patriotic Front was mostly worried about a sudden attack from the Rhodesians on their assembly points. Following concessions from the British (and more international pressure) as well as brinkmanship on the part of Carrington (e.g., sending Lord Soames to Salisbury before everything had been finalized) the Patriotic Front accepted. The most important British concession was "the stationing of British and Commonwealth forces, with the Patriotic Front troops, which precluded the possibility of any attack on them that was not also an attack on the British army."(118)


Characteristics of the Mediator

Identity of the Mediator

Lord Carrington was the British mediator. Britain, as a colonial power, had been in similar positions in the past when it was called upon to solve problems in lands which once belonged to the Crown and Britain felt that it had a 'bond' with these countries. Going into this negotiation, Britain did not want a repetition of the failures encountered at Palestine and Cyprus. Lord Carrington had been involved in negotiations in the past, as First Lord of the Admiralty and as Defense Secretary. However, in the mediation case of the bases in Malta, he had not been successful which he believed was due to outside actors and not possessing enough control. The importance that Britain gave to the Rhodesian problem is demonstrated by the fact that in his first morning in office, Lord Carrington said, "'We're going to settle it" and he has said that eighty percent of the Foreign Office's work at the time involved this issue. (119)

Power of the Mediator

Lord Carrington had two power sources. One was the power emanating from his position as foreign secretary of Great Britain which automatically gave him some amount of authority over the sides. However, the Commonwealth's mandate to Britain (i.e., to Carrington) for a mediation effort was his real power base. It was this mandate that gave him a wide-ranging freedom to 'bully' the sides into an agreement whether they wanted to or not. Patriotic Front could denounce Britain but not Commonwealth because many of their patrons and allies were part of it.

Stakes of the Mediator

Lord Carrington had his wounded prestige (from his previous mediation effort). Carrington had mining interests in Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia.(120) Britain had its prestige to deal with as well. Authorities in Britain probably felt that this conflict had gone on for too long and they were being humiliated. This feeling of humiliation explains why in this mediation effort they tried to keep it 'in the family' and not include 'strangers,' e.g., US. Britain also worried that this problem would affect its relations with the Commonwealth.

Margaret Thatcher, being more concerned about economics, wanted to be rid of this problem. Great Britain had much to lose economically if things continued: its economic relations with sub-Saharan Africa were in jeopardy. Nigeria, Britain's most important trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, was threatening British interests. Nigeria was not allowing British companies to tender for contracts. Nigerian head of state at the time, General Olusegun Obsanjo said, "We knew from our studies that we kept over half a million British workers at work through imports from Britain. . . . We could have stopped importation from Britain. That would have meant another half a million unemployed".(121) While he might have been exaggerating, it is true that Britain was economically in dire straits at the time. The OPEC crisis was still in the minds of the people.

Various elements in the Conservative party wanted to recognize Rhodesia immediately. Thus, Carrington and Thatcher also had their party to consider. Therefore, there was the domestic political stakes at play as well. Great Britain saw that its interests were affected; it had much to lose if this conflict persisted. Timing of the Mediator

This was the fourth mediation effort in as many years and the Rhodesians had declared their independence nearly two decades ago. Thousands of people had already died and many had emigrated or had become refugees. Rhodesia's economy was in bad shape but so was the region's economy. Militarily, Rhodesia's position was worsening. Therefore, this mediation effort cannot be called early.

All sides seem to have been ready for another mediation attempt either because they were coerced into it or because they saw it as being in their interests. British statements maintained that this was the final attempt. This effort can be classified as being late.Entry of the Mediator

The way in which the mediator entered

None of the primary parties to the dispute invited Great Britain to mediate. It was rather an imposed entrance by the British who wanted to remove this problem from their agenda. The British obtained the mandate from the Commonwealth to mediate in this conflict so that it would be in a better position to ward off criticism.

Problems encountered in gaining acceptance from the parties

The parties found themselves forced on to the table. Nkomo asked the secretary-general of the Commonwealth, "'Who gave authority to the Commonwealth to settle the future for us?'"(122) This 'imposed' situation caused resentment and the Patriotic Front was particularly angry. Both sides did not like the step-by-step approach and wanted to see the entire deal. The Patriotic Front was worried that Carrington was trying to improve the sort of the Rhodesians. Carrington's dictatorial attitude was not helpful.

Assessment of the attitudes of various parties toward the mediator

None of the actors really trusted the British or Carrington. However, the Rhodesians took a more silent approach and hoped that the Patriotic Front would leave the table which they believed would cause the 'second-class solution' to come to operation. From the Rhodesian side, Ian Smith had left the table and has said, "To me, British 'diplomacy' is a polite word for deceit."(123)

The Patriotic Front was worried that the British had a secret plan with the Rhodesians. Their attitude towards Carrington was negative throughout the negotiations. Amicable relations between the mediator and the various sides did not develop. Mugabe remained skeptical, believed that the British would not let him run in the elections, and "feared that the agreement was a way for General Peter Walls to win at the table what he could not win on the battlefield."(124) Mugabe and his people had harsh words for the British: "Thatcher can jump in the Thames;" and Lord Carrington "can go to hell".(125) Many times, it was the pressure of their patrons that kept them negotiating.

The Impact of intervention on the dispute

Relative power of the parties

Power parity did not exist between the sides and the mediation attempt did not change that fact. Militarily, the Patriotic Front was in a much better state. If the British wanted power parity to exist, they would have first recognized the internal settlement ('the second-class solution'). That was the only way to create a rough parity between the sides.

Lord Carrington always first negotiated with the Rhodesians and following their acceptance, he started to negotiate with the other side. This situation helped the Salisbury delegation who were hoping that the Patriotic Front would leave the table. The pressure was on the Patriotic Front. However, this was not really Carrington's doing. The Patriotic Front had initially committed the tactical blunder of saying that they would only negotiate with the British. Carrington used this case to the fullest and this can be considered as an example of the mediators affecting the power situation of the parties. The patrons (i.e., Front-line countries) were also used to warn the Patriotic Front that they had to comply if they wanted their support. Demanding new elections and then obtaining Muzorewa's resignation meant that the British mediation attempt had signed the death-warrant of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Resources available to the parties

Extra resources were made available to the parties. On certain issues, America and Britain offered face-savers to the parties. For example, on the issue of compensation of land, the Patriotic Front was told that they would receive financial assistance. This was an element that the Patriotic Front could take to their supporters who were mostly peasants. However, Carrington also used the Front-line states to warn the Patriotic Front that if they did not behave their assets would be taken from them. A couple of times, Carrington did say that he saw no point in continuing the negotiations; he did this to obtain more concessions from the sides, especially from the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front's soldiers were granted equal status with the Rhodesian forces which gave them more legitimacy. Carrington had the leverage of 'second-class solution' to use vis-à-vis the Rhodesians. The British held this 'carrot' of possible recognition of the internal settlement in Rhodesia throughout the negotiations.

Degree of overt conflict activity

During and after the agreement, there were few instances of overt conflict activity. A couple of times, Rhodesian soldiers bombed the Front-line countries. However, it seems that these were individual and not planned, official acts. The fact that the Front-line countries did not retaliate or become hostile to the talks is a clear indication of their desire for the ending of this civil war. At Lancaster Hall, there were some arguments, criticisms, demonstrations of anger and disapproval but it never went beyond words. The talks had ended the civil war.

Timing and duration of the conflict

The civil war came to an end with the Lancaster House agreement. However, tension continued for sometime to continue. Blacks and whites continued living pretty much separately. Although, there was some overt conflict between ZANU and ZAPU, a major conflict never broke out. While the Patriotic Front had successful in fighting in the countryside, fighting in the urban areas would have been harder as there were less people that they could count on. The original reason why the factions were able to attract many people still remains: land. The land issue has not been solved.


Patriotic Front received more publicity than the Rhodesians. However, this publicity was negative. The arguments that Carrington and the Patriotic Front started at the conference continued outside. Mugabe's image was particularly negative. The image that the other negotiators had of Mugabe was that of an intelligent Marxist-oriented militant and a good debater. However, the public only saw him as a militant. According to a foreign correspondent, the talks in London "'provoked little interest and even less enthusiasm among the whites'" in Rhodesia who "understood that they could not determine their own future but still feared the unknown".(126)

Roles played by the Mediator

Lord Carrington was not an impartial mediator who only intervened when the conference seemed to be at a deadline. Throughout the negotiations at Lancaster House, he was in charge. He was more of an arbiter, a referee than a mediator. There are few cases in which he actually backed down from his original positions. He did not allow free negotiations to take place. This was originally because of the Patriotic Front insistence that they would only negotiate with the British but later on when they wanted to engage the Salisbury delegation in debates, they were not allowed. So, Carrington had no intention of ending his job as a 'telephone wire' (i.e., communicator) because it was useful to him.

It can be said that the British agenda was an example of innovative thinking on the part of the mediator who saw that the parties to the conflict could not achieve it alone. For example, the British saw that in the matter of peacekeepers, the Rhodesians were against UN ones while the Patriotic Front wanted peacekeepers (and preferably UN ones); their solution was to create a British and Commonwealth peacekeeping force. However, this mediator as formulator must not be exaggerated because behind all the 'innovative thinking' and the suggestions was the sinister (and powerful) message of 'take it or leave it.'

The Times of London, one year after the negotiations, wrote that Lord Carrington had all the conference chambers and hotel rooms bugged.(127) It is not clear if this is true. Some of the Patriotic Front delegates said that they were aware of it and that they acted accordingly. If Lord Carrington really did this, this would mean that he knew how much pressure to apply. This case shows him in his true light: mediator as manipulator.

Lord Carrington was concerned about reaching a settlement based on the British proposals and ending this problem's domination of British foreign policy He was really a manipulator. Carrington used all his authority to force the parties into a particular settlement. He never stopped applying leverage. The carrot of 'second-class solution' was always kept dangling in front of the Salisbury government and the stick of the Front-line states was always behind the Patriotic Front. His use of power is ascertained by his appointment of Lord Soames as governor and his subsequent arrival in Rhodesia before the cease-fire had been actually agreed upon.

ZAPU's Nkomo compares Carrington to a spider: "A spider creates a round web and it parks itself in the centre. Then it darts out to pick up a fly. . . . That's what he was doing. . . . It was a 'spider' type of arrangement."(128) While it is true that there are instances of Carrington acting as a formulator and a communicator, he is the mediator as a manipulator par excellence.


The entire regime changed in Zimbabwe. The republic of Zimbabwe was established and became a member of the UN. Distrust continued but the parties still managed to have free and fair elections which resulted in Mugabe obtaining a clear majority. The seats for whites in the Parliament were reduced to twenty. The new regime acted responsibly and did not act as if it had a vendetta against the whites. More blacks started working in the civil service. Poverty-stricken blacks were helped by the new regime but the property of the whites was not touched. The main change from the British point of view was that this issue no longer occupied a place in their agenda. The British move of being involved in the implementation stage of the agreement (i.e., transition stage) played a major role in keeping the sides under control. The problem of land continues.


There was an agreement which resulted in the establishment of the republic of Zimbabwe. It was mostly an integrative solution. Almost all types of integrative bargaining took place.

Neither of the sides achieved their initial demands and were faced with unfavorable British options The options were disliked by both parties. The British believed that the only way forward was for them to formulate the options and then to present it to the conflicting sides (while making it clear that the choices were between accepting it and leaving the table). Bridging was thus used. The Rhodesians had initially demanded recognition and the ending of economic sanctions. They were not granted these but rather received some provisions and safeguards which, when compared to what they had, must have looked weak. Yet the Patriotic Front also faced similar problems. Patriotic Front's original demands can be summed up as the destruction of the remnants of colonialism. Instead, they agreed (with 'help' from their patrons) to not only give Rhodesian citizens automatic rights to Zimbabwean citizenship but also to reserve twenty seats in the Parliament for the whites.

The reestablishment of British colonial power was another example of bridging. The Rhodesians were not seen as directly turning power over to the Patriotic Front, and free elections (under British control) could take place; the Patriotic Front was sure that it would win. Both sides had initially different goals than what they finally agreed to but the final deal that they were offered was still acceptable (or forced to be acceptable).

Expanding the pie can be seen in at least three cases. The Patriotic Front obtained the promise of funds from the United States in return for dropping their demand for compensation of land. The Patriotic Front also received more assembly points for their guerrillas (a critical issue as the Patriotic Front knew that their soldiers would be vulnerable to a conventional attack, especially from the Rhodesian air force). British and Commonwealth forces were also stationed in these points which would have meant that an attack on the guerrillas would also have meant an attack on the British.

It can be argued that the most important case of expanding the pie was when Britain made it clear to the parties that its role would not end at the table but that it would also be involved in implementation of the agreement. This factor of bringing a 'policeman' was helpful to the parties who greatly mistrusted one another.

Logrolling can be seen in the issue of peacekeepers. The British knew that the Rhodesians would not accept United Nations peacekeepers but they also knew that the Patriotic Front insisted on the presence of peacekeepers. Therefore, the British (with some nominal Commonwealth contribution) took over the role of peacekeeping. It can also be said that there was logrolling on the two most important issues: land and democracy. The Patriotic Front "had got the main concession on the creation of democracy" and compromised on land.(129)

All of the sides believed that the elections would create a result favorable to them and the British used this belief. This can be considered a form of nonspecific compensation because the British held out the bait of elections in return for acceding to the agreement.

The Rhodesians said that the British had given them (secret) assurances that Mugabe would not be allowed to form a government and that instead Nkomo would be part of a coalition government. The Rhodesians maintained that it was this belief that made them lenient. This would be a form of cost-cutting: elections take place but the most militant side is not allowed to form a government. Incidentally, the British admit that while such a coalition government was one of the suggestions, there was nothing that could be done once Mugabe received a clear majority of the vote.

A case can also be made that this was a distributive agreement. The mediator had the parties lower their resistance points. Compromise settlements that were not to the liking of either party were pushed forward, e.g. having to return to colonial rule. Deadlines were imposed and a bleak future was forecasted to whichever side withdrew from the table first. Outsiders (i.e., patrons) were constantly used to bring the parties into line, e.g., when the Patriotic Front initially only offered partial acceptance of the cease-fire, the British had the Americans tell the Front-line countries that they were going to be lifting the sanctions applied by Zimbabwe-Rhodesia which resulted in the Patriotic Front being pushed into an agreement by the Front-line Presidents. The British scheduled and controlled the negotiations, e.g., the Patriotic Front's answer was always asked after that of the Salisbury delegation and the parties were not allowed to engage in free debates. Carrington was aggressive in general, e.g., when Smith went up to Carrington during the negotiations and told him that these were the worst terms that they had ever been offered, Carrington replied, "'Well, of course they bloody well are! You've turned down everything since the talks on [HMS] Tiger and [HMS] Fearless, and ever since the 1960s!'".(130)

Calling this agreement, 'win-win' or 'win-lose' is rather hard; the losers of the elections in 1980 might say that it was 'lose-lose' to them all except Mugabe. Yet, the people of Zimbabwe became independent and voted in a free and fair election. More bloodshed was avoided and certainly the urban areas did not experience the turmoil of a civil war. Overall, this was an integrative agreement but with coercion and manipulation thrown in so as ensure an agreement.


Charlton, Michael. The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Facts on File World News Digest. Jan.-Nov. 1980. EBSCOhost WEB Full Diplay. (Http://

Godwin, Peter and Ian Hancock. 'Rhodesians never die': The Impact of War and Political

Changes on White Rhodesia, c. 1970-1980. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993.

McCrea, Barbara and Tony Pinchcuck. Zimbabwe and Botswana. 2nd ed. London: Rough Guides, 1993.

Rotberg, Robert I. "Zimbabwe--History." Collier's Encyclopedia. 1996 ed.

Rothchild, Donald. "Successful Mediation: Lord Carrington and the Rhodesian Settlement." Managing global chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict. Ed. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

Stedman, Stephen John. Peacemaking in Civil War: International mediation in Zimbabwe. London: Lynne Rienner, 1991.

Swaney, Deanna. Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia. 2nd ed. Berkeley: Lonely Planet Publications, 1995.

Tamarkin, M. The Making of Zimbabwe. London: Frank Cass, 1990.

Email the author.

Back to the Table of Contents for Issue 1.4.

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1. Robert I. Rotberg, "Zimbabwe--History" Collier's Encyclopedia. 1996, ed. 4.

2. Rotberg 4.

3. Lorraine Eide, Ronald Mugabe World Leader Past & Present (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989) 47.

4. Rotberg 4.

5. Barbara McCrea and Tony Pinchcuck, Zimbabwe and Botswana, 2nd ed. (London: Rough Guides, 1993) 356-7.

6. Rotberg 4.

7. Eide 47.

8. Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International mediation in Zimbabwe (London: Rienner, 1991) 40.

9. Stedman 36-37.

10. Stedman 37.

11. M. Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe (London: Frank Cass, 1990) 9.

12. Deanna Swaney, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, California: Lonely Planet Publications, 1995) 107.

13. Swaney 107.

14. Tamarkin 5.

15. Tamarkin 130.

16. Stedman 119.

17. Tamarkin 173, 177.

18. Stedman 127.

19. Tamarkin 213.

20. Tamarkin 221.

21. Tamarkin 229.

22. Stedman 162.

23. Eide 58.

24. Tamarkin 243.

25. Swaney 108.

26. Michael Charlton, The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 18.

27. Charlton 32.

28. Tamarkin 266.

29. Tamarkin 253.

30. Charlton 67.

31. Donald Rothchild, "Successful Mediation: Lord Carrington and the Rhodesian Settlement," Managing global chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) 479.

32. Stedman 201.

33. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Guerrillas Lag in Assembling," Facts on File World News Digest 7 Jan. 1980: 7F2.

34. Ibid.

35. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia International Links Restored," Facts on File World News Digest 18 Jan. 1980: 31D3.

36. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Nkomo Returns to Salisbury," Facts on File World News Digest 18 Jan. 1980: 31C2.

37. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Black Parties Register," Facts on File World News Digest 25 Jan. 1980: 49B1.

38. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia State of Emergency to Continue," Facts on File World News Digest 25 Jan. 1980: 48D3.

39. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Refugees Begin to Return," Facts on File World News Digest 25 Jan. 1980: 49D1.

40. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia State of Emergency to Continue," Facts on File World News Digest 25 Jan. 1980: 48D3.

41. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia South African Troops to Leave," Facts on File World News Digest 1 Feb. 1980: 80D2.

42. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Mugabe Returns from Exile," Facts on File World News Digest 1 Feb. 1980: 80G1.

43. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia U.N. Warns Britain on Fair Vote," Facts on File World News Digest 15 Feb. 1980: 118C2.

44. Ibid.

45. "Guerrilla Leader Robert Mugabe Wins Zimbabwe Election; Pledges to Work for Reconciliation, National Unity Seeks to Reassure Whites," Facts on File World News Digest 7 Mar. 1980: 161A1.

46. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Refugee Repatriation Suspended," Facts on File World News Digest 14 Mar. 1980: 198G1.

47. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Guerrillas Start Army Training," Facts on File World News Digest 14 Mar. 1980: 198B2.

48. "Guerrilla Leader Robert Mugabe Wins Zimbabwe Election; Pledges to Work for Reconciliation, National Unity Seeks to Reassure Whites," Facts on File World News Digest 7 Mar. 1980: 161A1.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Guerrillas Start Army Training," Facts on File World News Digest 14 Mar. 1980: 198B2.

53. "Zimbabwe Rhodesia Mugabe Announces Cabinet," Facts on File World News Digest 14 Mar. 1980: 198A1.

54. Ibid.

55. "Violence, Labor Unrest Hit Country," Facts on File World News Digest 25 Apr. 1980: 301E2.

56. "Zimbabwe Gains Independence; Prime Minister Mugabe Installed U.S. Opens First Embassy," Facts on File World News Digest 25 Apr. 1980: 301C1.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. "Zimbabwe Request More U.K. Instructors for Army," Facts on File World News Digest 20 June 1980: 468G3.

61. "Zimbabwe Ends South African Ties," Facts on File World News Digest 11 July 1980: 509D2.

62. "Zimbabwe White Army Chief Resigns," Facts on File World News Digest 25 July 1980: 568D1.

63. "Zimbabwe State of Emergency Extended," Facts on File World News Digest 1 Aug. 1980: 581F3.

64. "United Nations Zimbabwe Becomes Member," Facts on File World News Digest 29 Aug. 1980: 643D1.

65. "Zimbabwe Mugabe, in the U.S., Praises Carter," Facts on File World News Digest 5 Sept. 1980: 674D2.

66. "Zimbabwe Smith Urges Whites to Stay," Facts on File World News Digest 5 Sept. 1980: 674B3.

67. "Zimbabwe White Emigration Rises," Facts on File World News Digest, 17 Oct. 1980: 795E1.

68. "Zimbabwe 43 Killed in Guerrilla Clashes," Facts on File World News Digest, 21 Nov. 1980: 888E3.

69. Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, 'Rhodesians never die': The Impact of War and Political Changes on White Rhodesia, c. 1970-1980 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993) 218.

70. Eide 60.

71.Godwin and Hancock 260.

72. Tamarkin 223.

73. Tamarkin 223.

74. Tamarkin 262.

75. Stedman 177.

76. Tamarkin 262.

77. Stedman 179.

78. Stedman 179.

79. Stedman 181.

80. Tamarkin 263.

81. Tamarkin 263.

82. Tamarkin 264; Stedman 182.

83. Tamarkin 264.

84. Tamarkin 264.

85. Stedman 183.

86. Tamarkin 266.

87. Tamarkin 266; Stedman 188.

88. Stedman 188.

89. Tamarkin 267.

90. Stedman 193.

91. Tamarkin 267.

92. Stedman 194.

93. Tamarkin 267; Stedman 194.

94. Godwin and Hancock 262.

95. Tamarkin 268.

96. Tamarkin 268.

97. Stedman 195.

98. Tamarkin 268.

99. Tamarkin 260-70; Stedman 198.

100. Stedman 198.

101. Tamarkin 270.

102. Stedman 198-99.

103. Tamarkin 270.

104. Tamarkin 271.

105. Stedman 200.

106. Tamarkin 272.

107. Tamarkin 272.

108. Tamarkin 272.

109. Stedman 201; Tamarkin 272.

110. Stedman 201.

111. Tamarkin 272.

112. Stedman 201.

113. Eide 64.

114. Tamarkin 252.

115. Stedman 206.

116. Stedman 173.

117. Rothchild 482.

118. Charlton 130

119. Charlton 12, 155.

120. Eide 66.

121. Charlton 45.

122. Charlton 109.

123. Charlton 91.

124. Stedman 206.

125. Stedman 201; Tamarkin 272.

126. Godwin and Hancock 262.

127. Eide 66.

128. Charlton 77-8.

129. Charlton 80

130. Charlton 90.