Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2.1

UNPREDEP in Macedonia:

Achievements and Limits of Preventive Diplomacy

By Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska


The 20th century, especially its final phase, is likely to be remembered in the collective memory of humankind as a very turbulent and dramatic age. There have been so many changes both on the national and on the international levels an this confirms the thesis that in the social sciences there are not and there cannot be absolute truths. Scholars are still searching for new answers to certain old dilemmas, and sometime they even have to start ab ovo analyzing certain questions that were considered as finally clarified. In this context, we are trying to re-actualize the concept of diplomacy versus the concepts of international security and state sovereignty. It is being done with the purpose of their recapitulation and facing them with the new historic situation emerging on the threshold of 21st century.

Under the influence of two earthshaking historical events, the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War, the concept of sovereignty has shown once more its attractiveness and complexity. Furthermore, the concept of international security is evidently influenced by the state sovereignty principle. This relationship is inevitably determined by two dominant and opposite global tendencies: integration and disintegration. The first tendency is manifested through awakened hopes for creating a New World Order, intensification of European integration, and the gradual, but certain, transformation of the systems of collective security. The process of establishing and/or reviving many state creations as a direct product of dissolution of the former Communist multinational conglomerates evidence the second tendency.

Viewed though the prism of sovereignty within the first process, the most actual issue is the overcoming of the traditional concept and the state-centric approach. In the second case, the states with newly gained independence at the same time strive for strengthening newly acquired (at least external) sovereignty and ardently look toward a united Europe.

Thus, while in the Western part of the Old continent the territorial state with its principle of sovereignty disappears, at the same time in its Eastern part the tie between state and nation is being reforged.(1) Keeping all this in mind, two interesting questions can be posed. First, how do these two opposite tendencies influence each other? Second, which one will prevail?

Undoubtedly, there have always been very complex explanations related to the diplomacy-security nexus.(2) In this occasion we are particularly interested in this relationship from the perspective of a transformative international agenda. Very soon after the early optimism emerged in the beginning of the new post-Cold War era, the international community (and especially great powers) faced new challenges and responsibilities in regard to the maintenance of world peace and security. For instance, during the period of the Cold War, the original UN system of collective security was maintained with new mechanisms like peacekeeping operations. However, both traditional and non-traditional mechanisms for maintaining peace and security have shown to be insufficient and non-effective for avoidance or settlement of so-called "wars of the third kind"(3). It seems that the main characteristic of the new security landscape lies in the fact that the gravest and the most frequent conflicts today emerge not between, but within the states.(4) New threats and dangers have asked for more flexible and subtle responses to the increasing number of regional and intra-state crises.

Unwillingly, the Republic of Macedonia has found itself in the center of all these global and regional mutations. It is interesting to assess why this small and underdeveloped country has become very important for the prospects of international security in the post-Cold War era.

Macedonia in the Balkans: Achilles' Heel or Hope for the Future? 

Macedonia's appearance on the international scene as an independent and sovereign political power coincided with this delicate moment of the evolution of international relations. From the very beginning, its existence has been marked with a series of circumstances that have given it a kind of exclusiveness in the eyes of international public. The Republic of Macedonia cannot be described simply as one another post-communist Eastern European countries.

It is true that viewed from one side, Macedonia has the features of many other post-communist Balkan countries, such as being a successor state of the former federation, being in the middle of the process of radical social transition toward democracy, and taking some first steps on its way toward independent behavior in the international arena. To put it another way, Macedonia stands at the beginning of a long and hard way with many uncertainties and challenges. At the same time, it is experiencing the cutting-off of the birth tie from the old political regime and its ideology, thus separation from the parent-state, and the emergence of first forms of democratization. However, the most important of all is the fact that it is still searching for its new international and political subjectivity and identity. There is little doubt that these and many other similar problems are contained in the transformational agenda of the newly established states in the region of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the following points distinguish and make the Macedonian case sui generis.

Let us keep our attention on this last point. There is a commonly acknowledged opinion that the peace operation established in Macedonia is the first preventive diplomacy and deployment operation in the history of the United Nations. The question is why here and why now? The explanation can be reached only through analysis of the historical and societal background of the Macedonian case and an understanding of the dynamics of potentially explosive conflicts in the Balkan region.

Consideration and evaluation of the current situation in Macedonia should not neglect the historical dimension of the problem, because it is a common truth that no state can escape its past. Macedonia's past must not be equated only with the communist phase of its existence - no matter how significant and onerous it has been - especially when surveyed from the current perspective. It is true that despite its long and very difficult national, political and military history, Macedonia was established as a state with all essential attributes as late as 1944/45, as a constitutive republic of the former Yugoslavia. However, the struggle of the Macedonian people to establish the state of their own has a much longer history.

This country's territory very often has been used as a battlefield for many armed struggles and clashes. Due to the fact that different invaders have come and gone from this area, the history of Macedonian people has always been very bitter and stormy.(6) The important geographic position may in some other circumstances or other parts of the world be a blessing, but to Macedonia and its population it became a curse.

A Brief Expedition through the History

Viewed from a geographic prism, the Balkan region known as Macedonia lies between the Shar and Osogovo Mountains in the north, the Rila Mountains and Mesta River in the east, the Bistrica River, the Aegean Sea and the Pindus Mountains in the south, and the Albanian highlands in the west.(7) It is interesting that there has never been any serious debate regarding the outlines of geographic Macedonia. In most general terms, it includes three areas: the territory of present Republic of Macedonia (Vardar Macedonia), the south-western part of Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) and the Greek province of Macedonia centered on Thessaloniki (Aegean Macedonia). On the other hand, political, ethnic and cultural boundaries of Macedonia are under contention even today.(8)

Throughout history many states have been established and crushed on this territory. The most glorious one is connected with the period of reign of Alexander the Great (336-323 BC), however contemporary Macedonians are descendants of the Slav tribe, which moved in the sixth and seventh centuries. This invasion caused significant alteration of the cultural and ethnic makeup of the region.(9) Macedonian territory most often had been object of Bulgarian and Byzantine rivalries. The Empire of Tzar Samuil (969-1018 AD) was only a short and tragic episode of Macedonian state history. Since fourteenth century the Ottoman Turks conquered this area (as well as almost entire Balkan Peninsula).

The nineteenth century was marked with the outburst of nationalism and intensification of national liberation movements among all Balkan peoples. National consciousness came late to the Macedonians, due to lack of cohesiveness and international support of their national movement. On the other hand, newly established Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian states, from the very beginning of their existence, manifested their competing claims over the inhabitants and the territory of Macedonia. Thus, neighboring Balkan national movements have completely forgotten almost every one of their previous solidaristic ideas and actions, which had been created as a result of their similar Slavish position and struggle, transforming themselves as exclusivistic and concurrent forces against the Macedonian counterpart.

The nineteenth century was also a period of intensive diplomatic activities and interventions of the Great Powers in the Balkans. The Turkish-ruled peoples considered that interventions as an encouraging sign. They were powerful impetus for emerging national consciousness, which gave rise to competing Balkan nationalisms. On the other hand, due to the fact that the Great Powers had fostered their own strategic aspiration on the Peninsula, conflict of interests, latent since the beginning of the century, began to develop into a pronounced rivalry in the 1870s.(10) Rhetorically, these countries wished to liberate the Christian peoples, but in fact their actions were driven by their obvious strategic, political and economic ambitions.(11)

Finally, after fruitless negotiations with the Sultan, Russia, searching for definite commitments, declared war on the Ottomans. The defeated sultan had to conclude a bilateral peace treaty with Russia at San Stefano in March 1878. This date represents a landmark in modern Macedonian history. Since then Macedonia's fate has been decided on different diplomatic tables: from San Stefano to Berlin, and from Bucharest to Paris, and never according to the authentic will of the people concerned. According to the provisions of San Stefano Treaty "Great Bulgaria" was to be established by the inclusion of all of the geographic and ethnic Macedonia. The Treaty of San Stefano has never been implemented. Because The Great Powers feared that this Bulgarian state would act as an agent of Russian influence in southeastern Europe, the Congress of Berlin was held in the same year. Macedonia was returned to Ottoman control under which it remained until the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century.

From the Macedonian perspective, the provisions of the Berlin peace agreement had special significance in regard to the legal and state-political status of Macedonia.(12) According to the Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty Macedonia, as well as the other Ottoman provinces, was supposed to be given special legal status within the Empire. As the exemplar for establishing a political autonomy in Macedonia, the Constitution of the island of Crete should have been used, which had been adopted in 1868. Inter alia for the first time in its political history, Macedonia was granted autonomous status and was regarded as both a distinct ethnic community and territorial unit. Formally, Macedonia was constituted as an autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire. Put in other words, Macedonia was freed from its international anonymity and entered modern world politics.

Due to a variety of reasons, Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty had never been implemented in Macedonia. However, the Ottoman rejection to do that provoked many revolutionary actions and rebellions. During the most important Kresna Uprising in October 1878, Macedonian revolutionists adopted a document known as Rules - Constitution of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee(13), which embodied the national program of the movement and the first vision of a sovereign Macedonian state.

However, the Ilinden Uprising of 1903 remains as the most powerful memory of national struggle of the Macedonian people. The rebellion was led by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which after early successes established new organs of government on the liberated territory centered in the town of Krushevo. It was the most important step toward de facto state building. Having in mind that the ultimate success would depend mostly on the Great Powers' support of the liberation struggle, the leadership undertook several steps toward its own legitimization before the international public as the only legal represent of the Macedonian people. First, a compromise was made regarding the final goal of the uprising. Macedonia was to be a "self-governed" territory within the Ottoman state, but under collective international control. Second, rebellion leadership declared and in practice respected the norms of the international military law. Third, IMRO developed intensive "para-diplomatic" relations with many states and public institutions, trying to obtain its active right to represent Macedonia in the international relations.(14)

Despite all these efforts for recognition of the wider interest for the Macedonian fate, both the Great Powers and the government of the Balkan states resolutely objected to demands for changing the status quo in the turbulent region. Left alone without any international political support, the Macedonian rebels were exposed to the most brutal repressions of the Turkish authorities. The actions undertaken for crushing the revolt were directed both to the armed and non-armed civilian population. Some international observers characterized those measures as a kind of genocide. This barbaric reaction was tolerated by the attitude of the entire European diplomacy, which recognized the Turks' sovereign right to suppress the internal rebellion by unrestricted violent means.

In 1912, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro completed the Balkan League - an uneasy alliance designed by Russia to finally push the Turks out of Europe and curtail great-power meddling in the Balkans. In 1912-13 the Balkan League warred against Ottomans, but Macedonia remained an "apple of discord", the chief issue dividing them. While the Balkan wars were perceived as an apparent victory for the indigenous Christian populations in eastern Europe, gaining independence in the wake of retreating Turkish domination, for Macedonians they represented a prologue of a new national tragedy. The First Balkan War began in October 1912. The Balkan coalition was quickly victorious, however in the peace negotiations that followed, the fragile alliance against the Turks collapsed over the unresolved issue of Macedonia. The end of Ottoman occupation heightened territorial ambitions that involved Bulgaria and its neighbors in further armed conflicts. The division of Macedonia in 1912 quickly set allies against each other.

One analysis proves the thesis that the strongest motivating factor involved in the Balkan wars was aggressive nationalism.(15) On the other hand, the Great Powers' involvement in the wars intensified nationalism and rivalry between neighboring peoples with race and even religion in common, dividing the region by fostering divergent allegiances. "In fact, the Balkan peoples did not realize they were not masters of their own fate, but that decisions concerning them were being made in St. Petersburg, Vienna, London or Paris."(16)

The provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913, which concluded the second Balkan War, for the Macedonians were highly painful. Macedonia was divided among neighboring states: Greece retained about 50 percent of the territory (Aegean Macedonia), Serbia (later the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Kingdom of Yugoslavia) occupied about 40 percent (Vardar Macedonia), and Bulgaria ended up with about 10 percent (Pirin Macedonia).

The Paris Peace Conference, which followed the end of the WWI, was the next occasion for IMRO for appealing to the international community to revoke the injustice. However, this Conference only confirmed the provisions of the Bucharest Treaty. The delegate of IMRO was not recognized as a legitimate representative of the Macedonian people, despite his regular authorization. By this rejection, the Peace Conference advocated the thesis that international-legal subjectivity could be given only to the states, and not to the national liberation movements and organizations. This attitude was favorable for the governments of the three Balkan states, which had annexed parts of Macedonia and had already started implementation of assimilation policy.

Toward State Independence: Macedonian Peace Story

Due to a number of reasons, which are not difficult to assume, the first Macedonian state was established as late as 1944, on the territory that the Republic of Macedonia occupies today. Macedonia's gaining a state sovereignty in 1944 as a constitutive republic of Yugoslavia was of dual importance: first, the people got a chance to determine themselves both in stato-political and in national terms(17), for the first time in history and secondly, the Macedonian issue was temporarily removed from the agenda of the political confrontations between the Balkan rivals(18). This largely contributed to the stabilization of the political and security situation in the entire Peninsula.

The Yugoslav Federation broke up for many deep and serious reasons.(19) Until the very end, when the situation became hopeless, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to play mediatory role between secessionist (Slovenia and Croatia) and centralist (Serbia and Montenegro) republics, offering a conception of so-called "asymmetric confederation or graded federation". Both republics were aware of the disastrous consequences that might follow after the Yugoslavia dissolution, due to their internal ethnic mix and the external constellation of relations on the Balkans.

While Slovenia and Croatia set up national guards as embryos of their new militaries and Yugoslav Peoples' Army (YPA) got involved in the emerging conflict keeping the side of Serbian politics, the Macedonian government behaved more carefully. Step-by-step Macedonian leadership undertook primarily political moves. The declaration of independence was followed by an independence referendum on September 8, 1991 in which the Macedonians voted overwhelmingly in favor of statehood. The new Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia was adopted on November 17, 1991. In January 1992 the Badinter Commission appointed by the European Union confirmed legitimacy of all these political steps and gave the clear recommendation for international recognition of the Macedonian Republic. However, up until the end of July 1992 neither the European Community nor other subjects had decided to recognize it. The main reason was the obstruction of Greece, which claimed a "copy-right" of using the name "Macedonia".

From an internal political standpoint, it is most important to stress that Macedonian leadership has proceeded more cautiously in its relations with the YPA than those of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, avoiding violent conflict. In this context, most important is the manner of gaining independence and constituting the sovereign Macedonian state. Its main characteristic was its realization without the use of force (either outside or inside); the completion of statehood was gradual and, what is the most important, in regard to military organization, the occurrence of any dualism was avoided, which excluded the possibilities of armed conflict. The key moment in this connection was the peaceful and civilized resolution of the problem of withdrawing the YPA and its troops from the territory of Macedonia.

Despite the fact that there had been some prior public speculation about the need to create a Macedonian national army, this step was taken only after the constitution of the entire state and political (civil) structure was completed. In this way, the trap of any (internal or external) pressures was avoided, in a relatively peaceful atmosphere for this region and with an absolute rejection of any military option. Therefore, there was no euphoria or national sentiment accompanying the AMR's constitution. Rather the pressure of the tragic events on the former Yugoslav territory and the dominant anti-military disposition of the wider public influenced it. It is interesting to mention that the group of Macedonian intellectuals centered on the Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action (MAAK) pronounced the Manifesto for Demilitarization of the Macedonian Republic in September 1991.(20)

In course of 1991/92, the Macedonian state had to undertake very important steps in order to constitute its own military force. In this regard one must have in mind the fact that during the YPA's withdrawal all the armament and military equipment were removed from Macedonia. In this sense, Macedonia had to make an account of its human (especially professional) potential and material resources left after Yugoslavia's dissolution, and at the same time to organize and utilize them in the best possible way. This transformation was additionally complicated by the UN embargo on the export of arms and military equipment imposed on all former Yugoslav republics.

The debacle of socialism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia have marked a new historic phase in the development of the Yugoslav successor states, including the Republic of Macedonia. All of these new-created states have gone through many political and security changes. In fact, the old problems have not been resolved by these major historic events themselves. On the contrary, only a range of new ones has been opened. After dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, the process of consolidation of the independent Macedonian state has been conducted in extremely complicated circumstances such as: a very low level of economic development, emphasized by disintegration of united Yugoslav market, the strong influence of Yugoslav armed conflict, and the possibility of escalation toward Macedonia, a range of problems connected with its international recognition, and especially the problems with its southern neighbor, regarding the name and the double embargo: the first from the north, imposed by the UN resolutions against FR Yugoslavia and from the south by the will of its neighbor. Nevertheless, in the first years of Macedonia's independence, the possibility of spilling-over the Yugoslav armed conflict was considered as the crucial and potentially the most explosive problem.

One of the problems that Yugoslavia's dissolution posed to this region and to Europe, was the revival of the old Macedonian Question in the Balkans, but now in radically changed international circumstances. The international community is deeply aware of the extraordinary relevance of the political, economic and geo-strategic aspects of this small state's existence. The importance of its existence is far greater than its territory and the number of the population it unites. Independence is no longer its internal problem, but it is conditio sine qua non for the stability of the region and the global security.

During the Cold War period the Balkan security relations were given a measure of stability and predictability. The Balkans was divided into blocs, with non-aligned Yugoslavia acting as a strategic buffer between East and West. Albania pursued a policy of splendid isolation, refusing to take part in any security arrangements or multilateral organizations in the region. The end of the Cold War has upset this delicate balance. "As a result, the Balkans have once again emerged as a zone of instability. The disintegration of Yugoslavia has added a new element to the equation, unleashing powerful centrifugal forces that could intensify instability throughout the region. There is a serious danger that the conflict could spread and spill over into other Balkan countries. Indeed, the Balkans could prove to be one of the main obstacles to the creation of a stable security order in Europe."(21)

The end of the Cold War has challenged previous sociopolitical and security status quo in the Balkans. Now it become obvious that during the last several decades of illusive peace and stability the old Balkan conflicts have been only frozen, and not resolved. Thus, the re-birth of independent and sovereign Macedonia in the Balkans has revived many old dilemmas, competing ambitions and unrealized dreams. It also must be kept in mind that only "in a few, if any, countries is the link between domestic and foreign policy so closely intertwined as in Macedonia. But the new state's troubles are also part and parcel of the Cold War related block politics."(22)

 International Community on the Move: Yugoslav Challenge

Yugoslavia's disintegration and the ethnopolitical conflicts in the successor states created one of the major challenges for the international community in the post Cold War era. Different international organizations, state representatives and prominent individuals have paraded for several years in search of a solution. For that purpose, various methods, techniques and mechanisms for conflict resolution were activated with minor success.

Initially, the European Community (later the European Union) took the lead in the diplomatic activity trying to preserve Yugoslavia's integrity. Later the diplomatic mantle was conveyed first to the United Nations and later to the US. "The Yugoslav question was the first serious test of the common European foreign policy, i.e. of the European Union foreign policy made possible by the Maastricht agreement."(23) There is a widespread opinion that evolving European institutions were still too immature for resolving such a tremendous crisis.

First, indications of the European Community's impotence to deal with the heightening Yugoslav drama became manifest in the process of the recognition of the successor states. From the very beginning a quarrel emerged among the European Union members, more precisely between the French and the Germans. "At the very moment that the EU's members resolved to establish a common foreign and security policy, the two countries (Germany and France) meant to be the prime movers in that process found that they did not even share the same basic approach to questions of stability and security in Europe, outside the EU itself."(24)

In this context, one must have in mind that these two countries have always advocated different political philosophies and approaches toward the issues of nationhood and statehood. The two basic theoretical conceptualizations of nation, which determine the essence of the nexus "nation-state" consist of the following premises: 1) first, the "state" definition is characteristic of the French tradition, and it considers a nation as the totality of persons born or naturalized in a country and living under a single government; 2) second, "objective" definition is based on German comprehend of a Volk, which is considered as a kind of cultural (in particular, linguistic) community.(25)

The EU set up a special body with legal-advisory duties (known as the Badinter Arbitration Commission) for examination of necessary criteria for recognition of the Yugoslav successor states. However, at the end the EU ignored the findings of its own Commission pursuing its own interests. Germany pushed for early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and France did not dare to threaten the newly and still fragile balance established within the Union. Finally, the EU recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia (despite the Commission opinion that it did not meet all of the conditions) on January 15, 1992, Macedonia had to wait until December 1993 (despite Commission's positive recommendation) to be recognized. Obviously, there was a lack of solidarity on the status of Macedonia. Beside the fact that the obstacle was made by Greece, Macedonia was disappointed with another painful and unjust decision of the major European powers regarding such existential question as the state recognition was. This act awakened bad memories of the many international forums in the past, which ignored the right of self-determination of the Macedonian people.

Macedonia's transitional hardships were additionally augmented by the Greek trade embargo imposed in February 1994. The EU decided to act more categorically and tried to convince its own disobedient member to lift the embargo. After Greece's refusal the European Commission brought the case to the European Court of Justice in April 1994. However, the US was much more persuasive in its mediatory role and the embargo was lifted in October the same year.

In sum, "the effectiveness of the EU diplomatic steps was undermined by an imbalance of power between the member states, the lack of a common foreign and security policy, the absence of Union solidarity, and the Union's failure to act as a neutral mediator."(26) Due to the fact that the Republic of Macedonia was not involved in the armed conflict, it was not in the focus of the enormous diplomatic activity of the EU. Thus, in some way, the problems of the only peaceful actor in the Yugoslav drama were neglected in that period.

The culmination of the Yugoslav war inevitably led toward involvement of the United Nations. However, it is considered that it was not "one of the happier chapters in the life of the organization"(27). The UN was put under enormous pressure by the expectations of the international public from one hand, and at the same time it faced a unique conflict in the heart of Europe. It was expected to play a role of impartial arbiter in the situation where engagement of all the parties in the conflict in immense ethnic hostility made it impossible to accuse only one actor. The different attitudes, policies and interests of the major countries (the US, Russia, Germany, Britain, France), very often handicapped the UN actions. The UN operations from the very beginning badly needed an absolute and strong support and clear direction, which was sometimes very difficult to be achieved due to the limited abilities for reaching sufficient agreement on the crucial issues. Very often these major international subjects tended to hide their own responsibilities in political failures and inconsistency behind the UN moves. Despite all of the above, it is true that "the UN and its agencies provided more emergency relief, saved more lives and played a larger role in preventing the spread of the violence to other areas than any other governmental or non-governmental organizations involved"(28).

From the beginning of the post Cold War era, the UN has been challenged to find adequate responses to the many new situations emerged on the basis of radically changed conditions in international relations. The global image of the international community after the end of the Cold War has clearly manifested the heavy burden both of the old and the new contradictions. Consequently, reassessing of the UN position and role has been imposed, especially in regard to maintenance of peace and security in the world. More important, it has become obvious that in the previous period the UN collective security system functioned much more through ad hoc solutions and principles established on the basis of precedents, rather than on the mechanisms defined by the UN Chapter.

During the Yugoslav conflict the UN established some precedents that may prove institutionally and conceptionally significant in future conflict and situations. In this context, one must have in mind that these operational actions on the field were accomplished by the Agenda for Peace.(29) This very significant document outlined by the former UN Secretary-General Butros Butros Ghali represents a concrete contribution and vision for developing UN capabilities and forms of interventions on behalf of peace and security in the world. In this regard, the first UN peace operation in the form of preventive diplomacy represents an extremely significant precedent and the Macedonian case could serve as a litmus test for its future performance. From Macedonian perspective, it symbolizes essentially a different kind of "interference" of the international community in its existence as an independent state.

UN in Macedonia: A New Prospect or Quick-Send for the Organization

The first initiative for deployment of UN peace forces on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia came from the Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov on November 11, 1992. In fact, at the beginning it was requested as the extension of the previously established United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Macedonian leadership was concerned about the possible impact of the Yugoslav armed conflict on the peace and stability in the country. After hearing of the report of the exploratory mission sent by the Secretary-General on November 28 1992, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia by its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992 as "UNPROFOR's Macedonia Command". The main intention was maintenance of the United Nations presence on the republic's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its mandate was originally defined as follows:

- "monitor the border areas with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

- strengthen, by its presence, the country's security and stability; and

- report on any developments that could threaten the country."(30)

By the Security Council Resolution 983 (1995) from 31 March 1995, UNPROFOR was replaced by three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations: UNPROFOR (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), UNCRO (in Croatia) and UNPREDEP (in Macedonia). The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was to be with mandate, responsibilities and composition identical to those in place.

At the beginning UN forces comprised a battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. Subsequently, in June 1993, with the Security Council authorization the United States provided about 300 additional troops in order to reinforce UNPROFOR's presence in the republic. Finally, the force of roughly 1050 soldiers has been composed of about 500 US troops, 350 from Finland, and smaller units from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Indonesia. Since March 1995 UNPREDEP's mandate has been extended several times for further six-month periods through 30 November 1997.

On 1 February 1996, UNPREDEP officially become an independent mission. Subsequently, the Council authorized an increase of the Force's strength by 50 military personnel and approved the establishment of the position of Force Commander of UNPREDEP. By the Resolution 1082 (1996) from 26 November 1996, the Council extended the mission's mandate for a further six months and decided on a reduction of its military component by 300 all ranks by 30 April 1997. The reduction was suspended due to turbulent situation in neighboring Albania, which was seen as an external factor that might worsen the situation in Macedonia. At last, the force was incrementally reduced in size to 750 troops in fall 1997. After the expiration of the latest mandate of the mission on November 30, among the members of Security Council arose a dilemma regarding its evaluation, continuation or changing. Finally, a solution was agreed upon: the mission would be terminated on August 31, 1998.

Establishing of the first preventive diplomacy and deployment operation in the history of the United Nations was welcomed both by Macedonian authorities and by the wider international community as a very encouraging and prospective precedent. (31) From the Macedonian perspective this was action with multiplied significance. As elucidated before, at that time (late 1992) the Republic of Macedonia was in a very delicate political, economic, social and security situation. It is true that Macedonia had almost no army or any other institutions to provide a consistent and efficient defense system. A larger problem at the moment was the embargo on arms against Macedonia, a country that was, unfortunately, an innocent victim of sanctions aimed at limiting violence in Bosnia and surrounding states. The international sanctions were not supposed to affect Macedonia, which was a completely new state, in such a way.(32) On the other hand, the situation in the other parts of the former Yugoslavia was still precarious and unstable. The Macedonian Republic was not internationally recognized by the members of the European Union by the UN or US. In addition, one must bear in mind that even the internal political and economic situation was still shaky.

Therefore, the coming of the UN troops was perceived as a very important "achievement" of the Macedonian government. It was (even unofficial) a kind of de facto international recognition and confirmation of its international existence and importance. For the general public in the country it was a very clear sign that the international community was not indifferent toward the peaceful Macedonian population, and even a premature optimism and misconception on the real scope of the UN mission prevailed.(33)

For the current government it was a very favorable record in the context of the internal political scene. It was an indication of international support of the politics conducted by the ruling political party and the President of the Republic, which had a stabilizing effect on the domestic plane. The immediate outcome was strengthening of the internal legitimacy of the government. It is also interesting to note that a wide social and political consensus was achieved. The only reserve was expressed by the Albanian part of the political spectrum. According to their opinion the only real external threat for the Republic was coming form the north (FR Yugoslavia) and not from the west (Albania). The Macedonian Government has always emphasized a protracted need for continuance of the mission "in order to maintain stability, preserve the gains already achieved and to avoid undermining the still fragile structures of peace in the Balkans. That view is shared by the leadership of other political parties and of various ethnic groups in the country"(34).

The UN, i.e. international community has had its own reasons for prolongation of the mission. The deployment of UN troops in Macedonia coincided with the alarming results of the CNN-effect on the international (especially Western) public, which patience was swiftly lost. The UN seemed almost powerless to stop atrocities in Bosnia, and new catastrophe could easily happened. Political analysts were unanimous claiming that war in Macedonia would be a true Balkan War.(35) Despite the fact that the Macedonian officials insisted that Serbia posed the main threat to Macedonia, it was clear that external aggression from the north was a highly unlikely scenario.(36) In fact, the Albanian factor represented a main source of a potential conflict escalation. It was supposed that if conflict erupted in Kosovo, the Albanian refugees would flood southwards causing disturbance of the fragile inter-ethnic balance and/or provoke interventions from different (neighboring) sides.

Unexpectedly, Macedonia offered a chance for the UN, which had lost much of its reputation and credibility in the Bosnian nightmare - to implement a new form of conflict prevention, preventive peace-keeping. The request made by the Macedonian President gave an excellent opportunity for rehabilitation of the UN and extraordinary case for testing the provisions of the Agenda for Peace.(37) Moreover, the preventive action offers undeniable humanitarian and economic advantages.

The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia is defined as the first mission in the history of United Nations peacekeeping with a preventive mandate. The mission's aim is to prevent disputes in its mandate area from turning into serious conflicts by using a variety of means, including troop deployment, mediation, negotiation, conciliation and other peaceful means. It is considered as evidence that even with a small, almost symbolic deployment of United Nations mission in a form of preventive deployment can be effective, if it is done at the right time and with a clear mandate.

The very fact that the preventive diplomacy operation has been applied for the first time in Macedonia presents an immense paradox - it confirms that Yugoslav drama could have been avoided if preventive diplomacy had been implemented in time on the other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Undoubtedly, in Macedonia it was activated in time (before any violence occurred), due to a series of coincidences and not because of the agility and awareness of the UN organs. It seems that the decisive and catalyst factor was the request derived from the threatened country. Even more, Macedonian authorities showed foresight in requesting preventive UN intervention. In view of eventual future operation of such kind the UN should have this point in mind. For "preventive action requires early action in order to be effective action"(38).

As for the clarity of UNPREDEP's mandate, a few things should be pointed out. There is official estimation that one of the main and the most important characteristics of UNPREDEP has been clear, and at the same time, sufficiently general mandate. However, in the course of time the mandate has been virtually changed and re-directed from external towards internal sources of threat. "Interestingly, while the operation's mandate and function appeared on the face of it to be primarily to uphold the integrity of the state of Macedonia - in other words was statist - it did, in fact, come to have an important ethnic dimension."(39)

Originally, UNPREDEP's main mandated task was to monitor and report any developments in the border areas, which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. The mission served as an early-warning source for the Security Council. At the beginning the emphasis was on troop deployment (military component), which was supposed to serve as a minimal but significant psychologically deterrent force.

Very soon the accent of the mission was changed in accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary-General: "It should, however, be stressed that UNPROFOR has no mandate in relation to the internal situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which could prove to be more detrimental to the stability of the country than external aggression. Although UNPROFOR stands ready to lend its good offices in appropriate circumstances, it has no mandate to intervene in the event that internal stability results in some form of civil conflict (...) It is UNPROFOR's view that the more likely sources of violence and instability are internal and thus beyond the mandate of the Force(40)".

Consequently, the Security Council in its resolution extended the repertoire of prevention techniques in this case. Thereafter, the mission focused more on other tasks like: assistance in strengthening mutual dialogue among political parties and helping in monitoring human rights as well as inter-ethnic relations in the country.(41) Thus, UNPREDEP was subsequently focused on three main pillars of its mandate: political action and good offices (political dimension), troop deployment (military dimension), and the human (socio-economic) dimension. The mission has been recognized as a significant instrument for facilitating dialogue, restraint and practical compromise between different segments of society. This is why some analysts began to pose the question "whether the operation had turned into an internal mediative, peacebuilding/development role, rather than a defensive hedge against spillover effects from neighboring states"(42).

It has been also stressed that UNPREDEP assisted in the country's social and economic development along with other agencies and organizations of the United Nations system. This last statement is very hard to accept having in mind that sustainable peace in the country is determined by economic development and social justice. "One of the causes for the precarious state of Macedonia's economy as a source of internal tensions was the cost of the mandatory sanctions against the former Yugoslavia and the unilateral economic blockade by Greece. While part of history now, they nevertheless cost the economy some US$ 4 billion."(43) In this regard one can say that the UN has "protected" and "punished" Macedonian citizens at the same time.

One of the main characteristics and, at the same time, one of the very important factors of the mission's success has been the cooperative spirit of relationship between the mission and the Government. This fact has been emphasized in almost every report of Secretary-General to the Security Council. However, after UNPREDEP's mandate had been changed there have co-existed two different interpretations and attitudes in regard to the real scope of the mission. This ambiguous situation can be illustrated with a letter of a Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General, in which inter alia was expressed a doze of reserve in regard to monitoring the implementation of minority rights: "the Republic of Macedonia highly evaluated the role of UNPREDEP, which although is not strictly in its mandate, significantly influences the rationalization and erasing of the debate on these issues"(44).

It seems that (invisible) tension between the host government and the preventive force has arisen since the violent incident in (mostly Albanian-populated towns) Tetovo and Gostivar last July. In mid August Macedonian Government received a copy of the UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, which provoked fierce reactions. The most disputable part of the report included a recommendation for strengthening the "civil component" of UNPREDEP. In this report Kofi Annan openly raised a dilemma regarding the relevance of the old mandate under the radically worsened internal conditions on the inter-ethnic plane. The current mandate was evaluated as anachronous. This statement was afterward strengthened by the similar proposal of Elisabeth Rehn, the UN Special Repporteur on Human Rights.(45) As could be expected the Government was unwilling to accept any sort of change to the UNPREDEP mandate. This attitude was justified with the argument that a strengthening of the "civil component" to monitor internal conditions violates the basic framework of the Preventive Deployment.

UNPREDEP as a Test for the Future

UNPREDEP, as the first and only UN peacekeeping mission with a mandate of preventive diplomacy, inevitably must be taken as a starting point in the evaluation of the preventive diplomacy concept. The Macedonian case has offered many arguments for the thesis that preventive diplomacy must be comprehended as an evolving and not as a static concept. Since mission establishment in 1992/93 it has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, especially in practical terms and under the influence of the events in the field. It is true that the Macedonian case could serve as a litmus test for future performance of similar preventive missions. Nevertheless, even now it can be said that the UN will have to advocate a case-by-case approach. On the other hand, conceptual thinking on preventive deployment is at a relatively unadvanced state.

The first problem that deserves special attention is differentiation between preventive deployment operations in inter- and intra-state conflicts. Both kinds of operations are to be based on the principles of state sovereignty, consent, non-intervention, and impartiality. In the first case, the emphasis is mostly on troop deployment (military component). The conclusion that can be drawn from the Macedonian case is that it is quite possible preventive deployment can be performed only by the request of the one country. Furthermore, the mission might be effective and successful when the UN troops are deployed on the one side of the border. Second case presupposes the usage of a wider repertoire of traditional and non-traditional preventive techniques. This means that the mandate, structure and organization of such operation have to be very flexible and delicate. While the UNPREDEP's mission was concentrated on external threat and played more statist role, consent of the host state was its operational parameter and the operation was relatively uncontroversial.(46) The very moment the mission turned toward internal sources of potential conflict, consent of the host state became questionable. (47)

The rebirth of nation everywhere on the former Yugoslav territory meant acceptance of the classical realist concept of sovereignty. Despite of all declarative announcements in regard to acceptance of the principles of liberal democracy and their own Europeanization, all these states have kept an instinctive fear that acceptance of the European option will derogate their newly acquired sovereignty (on the way they understand and implement it). Acts of assistance taken by international institutions are usually considered as interventionism and interference into domestic affairs. The origin of this fear can be found in the fact that real implementation of the principles of democratic legal state as well as the supremacy of the concept of human rights and freedoms (including minority rights) will inevitably impose redefinition of one's own statehood and sovereignty. Transparency and openness mean reception of some different criteria of political behavior not only in international relations, but also primarily in regard to the domestic affairs.

On the other hand, the Yugoslav drama has incited within the international community a necessity for a different perception of the state sovereignty. Namely, the crucial issue of the location of sovereignty has replaced the issue of the legitimization base of the sovereign authority. What actually happens is a dual shift of the sovereignty: to the international community and to the individual, all in the name of democracy and human rights.

At the same time, one must keep in mind that An Agenda for Peace primarily emphasizes the statist concept of preventive diplomacy. In other words, having in mind the sensitivity of a number of UN member states to the issue, An Agenda takes into account the classical sovereignty principle. This is why it does not dwell on ethnic preventive diplomacy (deployment) strictly. On the other hand, the very context of ethnic conflicts presupposed more liberal definitions of sovereignty and consent in peace operations. It seems the UN have still not found an appropriate way to overcome these objective perimeters based on the traditional approach to the state sovereignty. The main obstacle for creating and implementing a more pro-active concept of preventive diplomacy lies exactly in this fact.


Throughout many centuries the destiny of Macedonia and her people was the object of many diplomatic actions and negotiations among much powerful international actors. Solutions were usually adopted on behalf of the people concerned. Especially, at the threshold of the 20th century the Great Powers heavily influenced the Balkan affairs, creating deep scars on the historical being of every Balkan people. From the Macedonian perspective, European diplomacy showed its worst and ugly face. The main goal of international activities was achieving one's own state's benefits and disadvantaging other adversaries. Diplomacy, by definition, represents an activity with mostly non-hostile nature. However, unjust and even immoral interference and manipulations among infant Balkan nationalisms have left many open quarrels, unrealized dreams of Greater states and state of unfinished peace.

Almost a century later, Macedonia still represents the object rather than the subject of Balkan and wider international relations. It is still a country whose destiny depends on the constellation of international relations and on decisions of the major international players. Nevertheless, the situation at the threshold of 21st century is radically changed. Now the international community tries to prevent conflicts within and around Macedonia and to keep peace in the Balkans. In this sense, deployment of a conflict prevention force in this country has proved the thesis that it is part of the concept of modern diplomacy, no matter how semantically narrow the word diplomacy might be perceived. Macedonian hope for the future is deeply linked with this new kind of diplomacy, where the interests of the people concerned and the peace would have primacy.

Preventive diplomacy should be given the supreme importance within the international environment made after the end of the Cold War. It is a matter of the greatest concern for every member of the international community. One is tempted to postulate the moral imperative that the primary concern of diplomacy, in fact, should be to work to avert outbreaks of open conflict, both between and within the states. Preventive diplomacy can be seen as a concrete expression of fresh thinking and new ideas, which has begun to prevail within the international community.

Nevertheless, it is too early for ultimate optimism. There are still many dilemmas and unknowns. In this regard, one must keep in mind that the international arena is still in the hands of national states, and that international governmental organizations are still too weak in terms of being able to play a role of their own. There is an opinion that these organizations are hardly relevant as actors in international relations. They do fulfill, however, a number of functions that provide them with important roles as arenas for cooperation and conflict, as "facesavers" for great powers, and legitimizers for unpopular domestic policies.(48)

This contradiction between the role of the great players in world politics and the international organizations could have been seen at several occasions during the UNPREDEP's implementation in Macedonia. However, the most indicative was the bizarre situation that occurred during the Security Council session in early December 1997, when it was supposed to decide about the further extension of UN mission in Macedonia. Due to the quarrels among some Council members within only five days the mission was given two different mandates, from which lasted only four days (1-4 December). The problem arose when two opposite proposals were defined. The Secretary-General recommended further extension for the next six months, and Russia insisted on termination of the mission. Adoption of so-called instant-resolution was the Solomonic decision, which eliminated the possibility for the mission to become "illegal". Finally, the compromise between the US and Russia was achieved: UNPREDEP's mission would last for the further nine months, but - it would be its last mandate. This solution was far from being Solomonic, because the question arised of the valid criteria for the evaluation of the mission's success. The reasons for its establishment are still existing, and there have emerged some more.

The question, which rose the concern both of the international community and the Republic of Macedonia very soon under the influence of the developments on Kosovo - was what will happen after August 31? The dilemma was resolved by another prolongation of the mission's mandate, and strengthening of its military component. Having in mind the current situation in the region, it seems that there are two possibilities before the international community: indefinite presence of the UN forces in Macedonia or their replacement with NATO peacekeeping forces. No matter what option will be accepted in the future, one ought to point out that the creators of this preventive peacekeeping mission in Macedonia have been very thoughtful in their sincere wish to preserve peace in Macedonia, but the recent developments in the region has proved that peace could not be maintained partially, within the borders of one state, especially in the Balkans where all conflicts are tightly interrelated. It is already clear that the definite success of UNPREDEP mission depends on many various factors, which are out of the host-country. The Balkan states still look like a system of connected vessels, and due to this interdependence - peace in Macedonia is a part of peace in the Balkans.

In the light of the horrors of the Yugoslav wars, UNPREDEP has been evaluated as a clear success on the ground. However, military force, even in the form of a peace mission - or its mere presence - cannot solve all the problems. Macedonian citizens from across the ethnic and political spectrum will have to make more progress in achieving a modus vivendi that reinforces liberal democracy. But it is also essential to create a secure environment during the troublesome transitional period.
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1 "The ideal that every nation (people) should have its state, and that borders of the state should correspond to those of the nation, is an ideal with a strong position in the Eastern part of Europe. This creates the basis for classical type of conflicts: over borders, groups of people, the historical right to territories, over minorities leaving bigger states and possibly "re-uniting" with a mother-land." (Ole Weaver, "Identities" in Judit Balazs and Hakan Wiberg (eds.), Peace Research for the 1990s, (Budapest: Academiai Kiado, 1993), p. 145.

2. For a discussion of this nexus see R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, (London&New York: Longman, 1992), chapter IX, "Diplomacy and Security", pp. 184-201.

3. For more detail see Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

4. Zlatko Isakovic, Politicka i komunikaciona moc u medjunarodnim odnosima (Political and Communication Power in the International Relations), forthcoming, p. 214.

5. See Zlatko Isakovic, "International Position of Macedonia and Balkan Security", Working Papers, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, No. 9, 1997.

6. "Macedonia, with its central position in the Balkans which in the geographic sense represents a natural bridge connecting three continents and a focus of all the sub-European communications, is one of the most important crossroads and communication nodes in the South-Eastern Europe. Such a geo-political and geo-strategic position and the convergent interests of the surrounding states and peoples in the seizing and controlling this crossroad and communication node, has historically determined Macedonia as one of the areas of the fiercest European conflicts, as a region where a great number of wars have been waged, and various occupations, annexations, denationalizations and assimilations have been carried out. All this has brought difficult trials, sufferings and a great number of victims to the Macedonian people." (S. Dimiskovski, "Osnovi na nacionalnata odbrana na Republika Makedonija (voeno-politicki aspekti)" (Bases of the National Defence of the Macedonian Republic - Military and Political Aspects), (Skopje: Globus, 1996): 2.

7. See: Duncan M. Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: finding its way" in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott (eds.), Politics, power, and the struggle for democracy in South-East Europe, (Cambridge University Press, 1997): 227.

8. It is considered that there are clearly identifiable Macedonian, Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian perceptions on Macedonia, which include mutually exclusive versions of history and national identity of Macedonian people. (See more: Graham Craft, "Searching for Answers to the Macedonian Question: Identity Politics in the Balkans", Webedition).

9. Vasil Tupurkovski, "The Balkan Crisis and the Republic of Macedonia" in Constantine P. Danopoulos & Kostas G. Messas (eds.), Crises in the Balkans: Views From the Participants, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

10. "The United Kingdom was strongly opposed to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, especially in any way that might allow the Russians access to the eastern Mediterranean. The British attitude hardened in 1869 when the opening of the Suez Canal made the Mediterranean the shortest route to India. Russia, and to a lesser degree, Austria-Hungary, watched everything that happened in the Balkans with great interest. As far as Vienna was concerned, if the Balkans had to be liberated, better it be by Austria-Hungary than by Russia." ( Henry Bogdan, From Warsaw to Sofia: History of Eastern Europe, (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Pro Libertate Publishing, 1989): 135.

11. For instance, in July 1876 Count Andrassy met with his Russian counterpart Gorchakov in Bohemia, and two diplomats worked out a division of the Balkans: the west would go to Habsburg Empire, and the east would become Russia's.

12. For an indepth analysis see Alexandar Hristov, Sozdavanje na Makedonskata drzava (Creation of the Macedonian State), (Skopje: Misla,1990).

13. Pravilata - Ustavot na Makedonskiot vostanicki komitet (Rules - Constitution of Macedonian Revolutionaty Committee), (Documents), (Skopje, Institut for Sociological, Political and Legal Research, 1980). For a discussion see Vlado Popovski, Makedonskoto nacionalno-osloboditelno dvizenje do TMORO (Macedonian National and Liberation Movement until TMORO), (Skopje: Makedonska kniga, 1989): 171-196.

14. In this context, it is interesting to be mentioned that IMRO addressed Great Powers with special Declaration, which explained the reasons and the goals of the Macedonian people's struggle. In the Declaration the European Diplomacy was asked to be involved in the process of resolution of the Macedonian Question.

15. Zlatko Isakovic, "International Position of Macedonia and Balkan Security", ibid., p. 9.

16. Henry Bogdan, ibid., p. 146.

17. There always have been and there are still so many controversies about Macedonia and Macedonian national identity: "To the extent that identity is anchored in language, Bulgaria is the main threat: it regards Macedonian as a Bulgarian dialect (having no special status in Bulgaria itself). To the extent that it is anchored in religion, the Serbs are the main threat: the Macedonian church got a separate identity a generation ago, but is still under the Serb patriarchate in Nis... To the extent that it is anchored in statehood, the Albanian minority will not accept Macedonians defining themselves as the state-carrying people. When it is defined by territory and history, the Greeks object strongly to the biggest party, VMRO, showing maps where 38 percent of "Greater Macedonia" is present in Macedonia, 51 percent in northern Greece and 11 percent in western Bulgaria..." (Hakan Wiberg, "Societal security and the explosion of Yugoslavia". In: O. Weaver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup & P. Lemaitre (eds.), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, (London: Printer Publishers LTD, 1993): p. 107.

18. "After their oppressive treatment by Serbia in pre-War Yugoslavia, Macedonians blossomed in the dignity Tito offered them. But Macedonia continued to be the object rather than subject of Balkan relations. Its existence was accepted, but Greeks, Bulgarians and most Serbians viewed it as artificial. And many Macedonians seemed content with a status that was tolerated rather than fully recognized." (Jim F. Brown, "Nationalism, Democracy and Security in the Balkans", (Darmouth, RAND, 1993): p. 160.

19. For a serious disscusion of Yugoslavia's disintegration see: "Unfinished Peace - Report of the International Commission on the Balkans", Balkan Forum, Documents, no. 4, December 1996, pp. 183-350.

20. This document pointed out following premises: first, peace as a universal ideal exceeds all other types of experience; second, the solution for European peace is the creation of Macedonia as a neutral and independent state guaranteed by the great European Powers rather than patronage of conflicts in the Balkans and the fight for domination in this region; third, the demilitarization of Macedonia is a radical peace pattern in Macedonia and a comprehensive solution for the Balkan complex; fourth, the demilitarization of Macedonia is a complete defeat of militarism on the Balkans and a formula for friendly and complex cooperation with the neigbors and other Balkan countries; and fifth, the first contact of foreign weapons with Macedonia will mark the beginning of a Pan-Balkan and Pan-European slaughter. (See: Olga Murdjeva-Skaric and Svetomir Skaric, "Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia", paper presented at the XVI IPRA General Conference Creating Nonviolent Futures, Brisbane, Australia, 8-12 July 1996, p.11.

21. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and change in the Balkans", Survival, vol.34, Summer 1992, p. 32.

22. Vasil Tupurkovski, ibid., p. 138.

23. Vojin Dimitrievic, "The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis", Balkan Forum, no. 2, June 1996, p. 58.

24. Edwina S. Campbell and Jack M. Seymour, "France, Germany, and the Yugoslav Wars" in Constantine P. Danopoulos & Kostas G. Messas (eds.), Crises in the Balkans: Views From the Participants, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997): p. 303.

25. For an in-depth analysis see Hakan Wiberg, "Security Problems of Small Nations" in: Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen (eds.), Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe, (London - Washington: Brassey's, 1996): pp. 28-30.

26. Kostas G. Messas, "Failure in Former Yugoslavia: Hard Lessons for the European Union" in Constantine P. Danopoulos & Kostas G. Messas (eds.), ibid., p. 322.

27. E. Thomas Rowe, "The United Nations and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia", in ibid., p. 351.

28. Ibid.

29. Butros Butros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping, (New York: United Nations, 1992).

30. "UNPREDEP - United Nations Preventive Deployment Force: Mission Backgrounder", Department of Public Information, United Nations, Webedition, updated 12 June 1997.

31. Nevertheless, it is considered that the concept of preventive diplomacy is not a novelty and that its roots are connected with the name of Dag Hammarskjold, second secretary-general of the UN. For more detail see Alan James, "Preventive Diplomacy in Historical Perspective", paper presented at the Workshop on An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Skopje, October 16, 1996. Also see: Joel Larus (ed.), From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965).

32. Interview with Joseph Cruesel, Assistant Secretary of Defense of the US with the Macedonian independent weekly "Puls", MILS News, 26 May, 1995.

33. At the beginning there was a widespread public opinion that UN forces were sent with purpose of defending the country in case of external aggression. Later the public expectations and disposition toward the mission radically changed. For example, the result of the public opinion pool made in spring 1996 showed that 50.29% of the examined citizens thought that the peace in Macedonia could have been preserved without UNPREDEP. For more detail see: Olga Murdjeva-Skaric and Svetomir Skaric, ibid.

34. Report of the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali on the Extension of UNPREDEP's Mandate (May 1996).

35. See: Daniel N. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspective", McNair Paper, No. 20, Chapter 3, August 1993; Håkan Wiberg, "Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia," in Ole Wæver, Bary Buzan, Morten Kelstrup & Pierre Lemaitre, (eds.), ibid., p. 101.

36. In fact, the peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army proved that the Serbian politics had already been focused on its more important front in Croatia and Bosnia (the so-called first and second major interlocking conflict triangles or "powder kegs" in former Yugoslavia). Serbian interests in Macedonia were not so heavy and urgent, which was one of the main reasons for bloodless separation of this republic from former Yugoslavia.

37. According to the Agenda for Peace, preventive diplomacy can be defined as action which main function is "to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur". In that sense, as the underlying components of successful preventive action the following five instruments are recognized: confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment and demilitarized zones. (Boutros Boutros Ghali, ibid.).

38. Jan Egeland, "Preventive Diplomacy: Moving from Rhetoric to Reality", Key-note Address on the Workshop on An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Skopje, October 16, 1996, p. 2.

39. Jeremy Ginifer and Espen Barth Eide, "Ethnicity as a Source of Conflict", Balkan Forum, No. 2, June 1997, p. 196.

40. Secretary-General's Report S/1994/300 of 16 March 1994.

41. It is considered that the crucial and potentially most explosive problem in Macedonia is connected with inter-ethnic relations in the country, especially between the Macedonians (the majority) and the Albanians (the most numerous national minority, which comprises 23% of the population). For more detail see: Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, "Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia: Can There Be Winners and Losers?", Peace and Security, Vienna, vol. XXIX, September 1997, pp.39-46; Robert W. Mickey and Adam Smith Albion, "Success in the Balkans? A Case Study of Ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia" in Ian Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz (eds.), Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue, (Institute for East-West Studies, 1993).

42. See Shashi Tharoor, "The Concept of Preventive Deployment in the 1990's", paper presented at the Workshop on An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Skopje, October 16, 1996, p. 12.

43. Henryk J. Sokalski, "Preventive Diplomacy: the Need for a Comprehensive Approach", Balkan Forum, No. 1, March 1997, p. 46.

44. Letter of Minister Ljubomir Frckovski of August 6, 1996, quoted by Henryk J. Sokalski, ibid, p. 45.

45. MILS News, 28 August 1997.

46. Jeremy Ginifer and Espen Barth Eide, ibid., p. 196.

47. Visible collisions on the relation Macedonian Government - the UN appeared during the mast few months of the latest UNPREDEP mandate. In his report to the Security Council from November 20, 1997, Kofi Annan announced with slight resignation that the host government had told the Special Representative that his good offices were not needed in regard to the inter-ethnic relations. See: "Pocetak kraja misije UN u Makedoniji" ("The beginning of the end of the UN Mission in Macedonia"), AIM, 19 December, 1997.

48. Hans Mouritzen, "Twining Plants of International Cooperation: Reflections on the Peculiarities of 'Security' IGOs" in Jaap de Wilde and Hakan Wiberg (eds.), Organized Anarchy in Europe. The Role of States and Intergovernmental Organizations, (London&New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996): pp.65-85.